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NOTES
lawful manner, there can be no doubt in the ordinary situation as to who
has the right of way when the paths of vehicles intersect.
But as shown above, various extraordinary situations have arisen re-
quiring a modified application of the right of way rules. In these cases
the courts have attempted to balance the interests of safety and certainty
with those of reasonableness and fairness. In most cases such a balance has
been achieved, but in others there is great need for adjustment.
SHELDON PORTMAN
Estate Tax Liability and the Marital
Deduction
T DIES restate in 1952 survived by his wife and two children. The
widow, however, renounces the will and elects to take one-third of the
estate as provided in Ohio by the statutes of descent and distribution and the
election statute. The value of the estate after payment of all proper charges
except the federal estate tax is $2,000,000. A controversy arises as to
whether the widow is entitled to receive one-third of the estate after the
payment of all proper charges against the estate including the federal
estate tax, or whether the widow is entitled to receive one-third of the estate
after the payment of all proper charges against the estate without deducting
from the share of the widow any charge for the payment of the federal
estate taxes.
In the United States Revenue Act of 1948, Congress amended the Fed-
eral Estate Tax Law and provided a marital deduction.1 Basically, this
allows a deduction, from the gross estate2 of the decedent in determimng the
taxable estate, of that property passing3 outright to the surviving spouse.
The deduction is limited to one-half of the adjusted gross estate.4
In the example given above, the amount of the marital deduction and
therefore the value of the taxable estate and the amount of the federal estate
tax would vary depending upon whether the widow's share of the estate
must bear its proportionate share of the federal estate tax. If the share of the
widow is computed without being burdened with any part of the federal
estate tax, its value will be $666,667; the amount of the marital deduction will
be $666,667; and the total federal estate tax will be $356,533. If the
widow must pay her proportionate share of the estate tax, her share becomes
$529,425; the marital deduction correspondingly $529,425; and the total
federal estate tax $411,724.
1INT. REv. CODE § 812 (e) (1).
2 INT. REv. CODE § 811.
3INT. REV. CODE § 812 (e) (3).
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Thus it is observed that when the share of the widow bears its propor-
tionate burden of the estate tax, the total tax increases 1)y $55,191, the
widow's share and that of each child is 33.3% of the estate after the deduc-
tion of the federal estate tax ($529,425) Where the widow is not required
to bear any portion of the tax, the total tax is smaller; she receives 40.56%
of the estate after deduction of the estate tax ($666,667) while the share of
each child becomes 29.72% ($488,400) The widow in this latter de-
termination receives 10.84% ($178,267) more than each of the children.
The provision of the Internal Revenue Code granting the marital de-
duction is considered only in the computation of the Federal Estate Tax; it
does not determine who shall bear the burden of the tax. In Rfggs v. Del
Drago,5 the United States Supreme Court said: " Congress did not
contemplate [in providing for the marital deduction] that the Government
would be interested in the distribution of the estate after the tax was paid
Congress intended that state law should determine the ultimate thrust of the
tax." Thus it is clear that the states must resolve the question of by whom
the tax is to be borne.
If state statutes dealing with payment of the tax specifically so provide,
the question of by whom the federal estate tax should be paid may be an-
swered by a specific provision in the will of the decedent. In some juris-
dictions the point does not appear to have been disputed in the absence of
such statutory provision. In the absence of such a provision in the will, in
the case of intestacy or in the case of renunciation of the will by the sur-
vivors, various solutions have been effected by both legislative enactment
and judicial decision by the states.
At present 16 states6 have so-called apportionment statutes that distrib-
ute the burden of the estate tax among the various beneficiaries according
to the value of the interests they receive from the estate. Eight of these spe-
cifically provide,7 or have been interpreted' as providing for exemption of
that portion of the estate included in the marital deduction from liability for
'INT. REV. CODE § 812 (e) (2)
'Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 98, 63 Sup. Ct. 109, 110 (1942) See also:
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 66 Sup. Ct. 178 (1945).
'Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Fla., Md., Mass., Neb., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Ore., Penna.,
Tenn., Tex., Va.TNEB. REV. STAT § 77-2108 (Cum. Supp. 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A.25-33
(1953); N.Y. DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW § 124 (3) (e) (Supp. 1953)
"CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 970-972 (1944), In re Buckbantzs Estate, 120 Advance
Cal. App. 121, 260 P.2d 794 (1953); CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 2075-2081
(1949), h? re Jerome's Estate, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A.2d 139 (1952); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 2901 (1953), Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 94 A.2d 703
(Del. 1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1953), In re Fuchs Estate, 60
So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 881-884 (Supp. 1953), In re
Anderson s Estate, 68 Montg. 348, 66 York 145 (1953)
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any portion of the tax. Five more9 have statutes similar to those just men-
.tioned and would probably be interpreted to relieve the surviving spouse
from liability for the tax on property included in the marital deduction.
The Texas statute'0 seems to indicate that such property must bear its pro-
portionate share of the tax. Maryland" exonerates a surviving spouse from
payment of any part of the tax where the portion of the estate of the decedent
not passing to the spouse is sufficient to discharge the tax, except that no
such exoneration is allowed where the surviving spouse renounces the will.
The Oregon statute' 2 is similar to that of Maryland.
In those states not having proration (apportionment) statutes, where
the courts have considered the question of whether property qualifying
under the marital deduction is exempted from the federal estate tax, the
decisions are m conflict. Illinois,'2 North Carolina' 4 and Wisconsi r ' 5 have
required the surviving spouse to pay a portion of the tax, while Kentucky' 8
and Ohio'7 have exempted the surviving spouse from such contribution.
The Iminois case,' s applying the rule of cases'0 decided prior to enact-
ment of the marital deduction provision, held that the federal estate tax is
a debt of the estate to be paid out of the estate as a whole, and that the
widow's share must bear its proportionate burden of the tax. Essentially
the same rationale was applied by the North Carolina court 0 in requiring
the dissenting widow (i.e., a widow who renounces the will and under ap-
plicable election statutes elects to take under the statues of descent and dis-
tribution) to pay her proportionate part of the federal estate tax. The share
of the widow is determined after the payment of all debts of the estate in-
cluding federal estate taxes.2
The most recent state decision on this problem was made by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. 2 Agreeing with Illinois and North Carolina, the
"ARK. STAT. ANN., ut. 63, § 150 (1947); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 65A, § 5; N.H.
REv. LAWS c. 88-A as added by laws of 1943, and amended by laws of 1947, c. 102;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8350.7 (Williams Supp. 1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-151
(Supp. 1952).
"Tex. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN., Art. 3683a (1952).
"MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 81, § 161 (1951)
"ORE. LAWS OF 1949 c. 475 § 2 as amended by laws of 1951, c. 386.
"Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 II. App. 546, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).
'
4 Wachovia Bank v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
Uihlein v. Uihlein, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953).
"Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1951).
'
T Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
' Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 I. App. 546, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).
1 9First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.B.2d 461 (1943).
'Wachovia Bank v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
'North Carolina subsequently amended her statutes to provide that where a married
man dies testate leaving a widow but no children and the widow dissents from the
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court designated the estate tax a charge against the entire estate and did not
allow the property qualifying under the marital deduction to escape the
burden of the tax. The rationale of the opposing view was expressly re-
pudiated as being "untenable," on the grounds advanced by the dissent in the
Ohio case -that the federal estate tax itself and the doctrine of Rsggs v.
Del Drago negatived any intention by Congress that property constituting
the marital deduction should not bear any portion of the tax, and that the
distribution of the estate between the children and the widow is inequitable
when determined under the opposing theory.
The highest court of Kentucky23 exempted the dissenting widow from
payment of any part of the estate tax, reasoning that Congress in creating
the marital deduction intended to eliminate from the tax burden all those
allotments that did not create or add to the tax, and that since the marital
deduction is taken before arriving at the net taxable estate, it should not be
burdened with any portion of the estate tax.2 4 A prior rule of "equitable ap-
portionment relative to the imposition of the federal estate tax" was ap-
plied to exempt the widow's share from the tax. This case may be of doubt-
ful value as a precedent because the court, in affirming the decision of the
trial court, noted that all parties were satisfied with the decision since it
resulted in the lowest tax and apparently was appealed only to obtain a
final determination.
Where the widow renounced the will and took her statutory one-third
share of the decedent's estate, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in Miller v.
Hammond,2 that the surviving spouse was entitled to a credit for the marital
deduction and that the widow's portion should not be burdened with any
part of the federal estate tax. The court relied upon Indusirtal Trust Co. v.
Budlong,26 interpreting that case to hold: "In the absence of a testamentary
direction to the contrary, the federal estate tax on all the property within
the testamentary estate will be paid from the residue while all non-testa-
mentary interests will bear only the burden of the estate taxes attributed to
them."27  The rationale of the Kentucky case was approved and that case
was cited as authority for the recognition of a common law rule of equitable
will, her share is one half of the personal estate of the testator after all debts exclu-
sive of the federal estate tax have been paid, thus making the rule in North Carolina
exactly opposed to the decision in the Green case, in that specific fact situation. N.C.
GEN. STATS. § 28-149 subs. 3 (c) (Supp. 1953)
22 Uihlein v. Uihlein, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953)
' Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1951)
-" The Kentucky court relied upon In re Peters Will, 204 Misc. 333, 88 N.Y.S.2d
142 (1949), af 'd 275 App. Div. 950, 89 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1949), which was decided
under the New York apportsonment statute.
' 146 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952)
" 77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600 (1950)
'Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 493, 104 N.E.2d 9, 18 (1952)
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apportionment. The court also seemed unpressed by the fact that its de-
cision resulted in a lower tax and was therefore "equitable."
The dissent vehemently attacked the reasoning of the majority. The
majority adopted the Kentucky view that Congress intended that the mari-
tal deduction should exempt the widow from any share of the tax. The
dissent points out that Riggs v. Del Drago28 and the federal estate tax law
itself29 negative this conclusion. The decision was assailed by the dissent
as amending the statutes of descent and distribution by giving the widow
more than her one-third share of the assets remaining after the debts of the
estate are paid, which debts have been held in Ohio to include the federal
estate tax.30 The dissent criticized the Kentucky equitable apportionment
rule as being peculiar to that jurisdiction. Although the majority con-
sidered the computation of the tax inequitable when it resulted in a larger
total tax, the dissent revealed the gross inequity of this decision: the widow
received more ($198,000 more) as her share ($178,267 in the example)
than either of the children received in their supposedly equal one-third
shares.31
The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, on January 20, 1954, re-
versed the decision of the Probate Court of that county, applied the doc-
trine of the Miller case and relieved the dissenting widow from liability for
the estate tax. It was held3 2 that the term "net estate" in the Ohio statute
limiting the share of the surviving spouse to one-half of the net estate33 meant
the same quantity of an estate as described in the statute of descent and
distribution.3" Therefore the Miller case which had construed the latter
statutes controlled. The reasoning of the Miller case was not discussed.
2'317 U.S. 95, 63 Sup. Ct 109 (1942).
2'INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (E) " (E) In determining for the purposes of sub-
paragraph (A) the value of any interest in property passing to the surviving spouse
for which a deduction is allowed by this subsection- (i) there shall be taken into
account the effect which a tax imposed by this chapter, or any estate, succession, leg-
acy or inheritance tax has upon the net value to the surviving spouse of such inter-
est;... :'
Comn'n v. Lamprecht, 107 Ohio St. 535, 140 N.E. 333 (1923)
It is interesting to note that Judge Taft who dissented in the Miller case, wrote the
majority opinion in the subsequent case of McDougal v. Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104
N.E.2d 441 (1952), where apportionment between probate and non-probate assets
induded in the taxable estate was decreed on the grounds of a common obligation.
In this case Taft reiterates his convictions expressed in the Miller case, though he
distinguishes that case. Query whether there was any less of a common obligation to
pay the tax in the Miller case.
" Campbell v. Lloyd, Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga County, No. 22947
3Omio REv. CODE § 2107.39 (OHo GEN. CODE § 10504-55).
"OHIo REv. CODE § 2105.06 (OHio GEN. CODE § 10503-4)
Campbell v. Lloyd, Supreme Court of Ohio, No. 33, 911, motton to certify granted.
"See: 'Taxatfon," 4 WEsT. REs. L. REv., 259, 262.
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